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HOW SHOULD SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
BE REGULATED? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Before 2007, few had heard of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). SWFs 
became visible during the subprime mortgage housing crisis that began in 
summer 2007, during which large U.S.-based financial institutions suffered 
huge losses and turned to foreign investors to ease the resulting credit 
crunch. In many cases, these investors are state-controlled.1 According to 
an estimate by Morgan Stanley, SWFs invested about $37 billion in U.S. 
financial institutions in 2007.2 Although SWF infusions have alleviated the 
credit crunch and played a stabilizing role, SWFs have raised concerns due 
to their high-profile deals and increasing sizes. First, SWFs are generally 
opaque about investment criteria, management, and financial information, 
thus potentially presenting a systematic risk to market security.3 Second, 
because they are controlled by governments, SWFs may not focus on 
wealth maximization. 4
                                                                                                                 
 1. When Nations Amass Dollars, the Fault Lies in Ourselves, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2008, at 
10A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20080121/edit21.art.htm. 
 Non-commercial considerations may threaten the 
 2. See Anders Aslund, The Truth About Sovereign Wealth Funds, FOREIGN POLICY, Dec. 
2007, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4056; see also China Fund Grabs 
Morgan Stanley Stake, THE SIDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 20, 2008, available at 
http://business.smh.com.au/china-fund-grabs-morgan-stanley-stake/20071220-1i6p.html (stating 
in December 2007, the China Investment Corporation invested $5 billion in Morgan Stanley, soon 
after the financial firm announced it was writing off $9.4 billion of loss in mortgage investments); 
Citi to Sell $7.5 Billion of Equity Units to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, REUTERS, Nov. 26, 
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSN2643967220071127 (discussing that in 
November 2007, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), the world’s largest state-owned 
fund, purchased a 4.9% stake in Citigroup for $7.5 billion); Marine Cole, Hybrids Let Foreign 
Investors Skirt Fed’s 9.9% Wall, FIN. WEEK, Jan. 21, 2008, available at 
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080121/REG/9599056/1028; 
Thomas Heath, Government of Abu Dhabi Buys Stake in Carlyle, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 21, 
2007, § Financial, at D01 (stating in September 2007, Dubai’s Mubadala Development Company 
invested $1.35 billion for a 7.5% stake in the Carlyle Group, a private-equity firm); Merrill Lynch 
Will Sell Stake to Temasek Holdings, REUTERS, Dec. 25, 2007, 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/22395384/ (Merrill Lynch announced that Singapore’s Temasek would 
buy $4.4 billion worth of Merrill stock with an option to buy $600 million more by March 2008); 
Yalman Onaran, Citigroup, Merrill Receive $21 Billion from Investors, REUTERS, Jan. 15, 2007, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=anjGWhqi0PSE&refer=home 
(discussing that in January, 2008, sovereign funds from Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Singapore, and South 
Korea provided a $21 billion infusion of capital to Citigroup and Merrill Lynch. The funds owners 
were Tokyo-based Mizuho Financial Group Inc., the Korean Investment Corp., the Kuwait 
Investment Authority, the Government of Singapore Investment Corp. and Saudi Prince Alwaleed 
bin Talal). 
 3. See generally EDWIN TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD FOR SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
(Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. 2007) [hereinafter TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD]. 
 4. EDWIN TRUMAN, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THE NEED FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 4–6 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. 2007) [hereinafter TRUMAN, 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS]. 
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national security of host countries.5
The United States has modified the Foreign Investment and National 
Security Act (FINSA) to strengthen interagency review of foreign 
investment.
 Given these concerns, there have been 
calls for greater scrutiny of SWF activities. 
6 France and Germany have avowed that they will not allow 
acquisitions from state-controlled investors to take place in their territories.7 
Some economists and policy makers, however, see restrictions on SWFs as 
protectionist responses and are concerned about the negative effects of 
protectionism.8 They stress the benefits of foreign capital, such as lowering 
interest rates and promoting employment and innovation.9
II. SWFS: DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT APPROACHES 
 
There is a delicate balance between the protection of national security 
and an open investment policy. This note argues that FINSA, a unilateral 
U.S. regulation of foreign investment with an emphasis on SWFs, is 
unnecessary and may even be harmful to the U.S. capital markets and 
overall economy. In coordination with other countries, especially the 
European countries into which SWF capital has increasingly flowed, the 
U.S. should instead further its efforts for increased SWF transparency. In 
addition, the U.S. should maintain and refine its present regulation of 
foreign ownership in sensitive industries such as energy and 
telecommunications. 
Part II of this note describes the history of SWFs and their current 
development. Part III addresses concerns and benefits relating to SWFs. 
Part IV reviews U.S. policy and regulation of foreign investment. Part V 
argues for the establishment of a set of international guidelines that address 
SWF transparency. Part VI concludes by arguing that U.S. efforts to 
establish international guidelines for SWF activities will be in line with 
U.S. national interests and the open investment policy that the United States 
has traditionally advocated. 
An SWF is a government investment vehicle funded by foreign 
exchange assets that are managed separately from a country’s official 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. 
 6. Ed Mullane & Bhavna Kaul, Sovereign Wealth Funds Could be Impacted by Upcoming 
FINSA Regulations, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d33cd7fc-
d34b-11dc-b861-0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid=e8477cc4-c820-11db-b0dc-000b5df10621.html. 
 7. Carter Dougherty, Europe Looks to Control State-run Investors; Officials are wary of 
Intentions of China and Russia, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 14, 2007, § News, at 1; see also 
Sarkozy Attacks Wealth Funds on Eve of Mideast Trip, REUTERS, Jan. 12, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUSL1220023020080112. 
 8. Asset-backed Insecurity, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, available at 
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10533428. 
 9. Id. See also Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much 
Congressional Involvement is Too Much, 93 IOWA L. REV. 325, 331 (2007). 
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reserves.10 In addition to high foreign currency exposures, SWFs feature 
other key elements, including a high-risk tolerance, long investment 
horizons, and a lack of explicit liabilities.11
Although the term was recently coined, SWFs are by no means a new 
phenomenon. The first fund, Kuwait Investment Board, was established in 
1953.
 
12 Early sovereign funds generally had moderate goals. For example, 
the Kuwait fund was created as a means to stabilize its economy from 
volatile oil prices,13 and Kiribati’s Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund was 
formed in 1956 to manage profits from phosphate mining.14 However, the 
landscape of SWFs has changed. As SWFs have grown rapidly in recent 
years, countries’ currency reserve cushions intended for economic 
stabilization have exceeded their immediate needs. 15  Accordingly, SWF 
owners have begun engaging in riskier, yet potentially higher-yielding, 
investments.16
A. RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF SWFS 
 
The 1970s and 1990s saw the two major waves of SWF formation. In 
the 1970s, in response to the oil crisis caused by the Arab oil embargo, 
Middle East and American countries established funds to mitigate oil 
shock. 17  In the 1990s, more sovereign funds were formed, following 
Norway’s Government Pension Fund - Global, which was launched in 1990 
to preserve wealth for future generations of Norwegians. 18  This wave 
continues today. In the past eight years, funds have been established by 
China, Iran, Russia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.19
                                                                                                                 
 10. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INT’L ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE 
RATE POLICIES (2007), http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/economic-exchange-
rates/. 
 11. STEPHEN JEN, CURRENCIES: THE DEFINITION OF A SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND, MORGAN 
STANLEY GLOBAL RES. Oct. 25, 2007, available at 
http://sovereignwealthfunds.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/the-definition-of-a-sovereign-wealth-
fund-morgan-stanley-october-2007.pdf. 
 12. See generally Martin Weiss, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Background and Policy Issues, CRS 
REPORT FOR CONGRESS (RL34336; Jan. 28, 2008) (discussing how the Kuwait Investment Board 
was later acquired by the Kuwait Investment Authority, a separate fund founded in 1960). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. David J. Lynch, Foreign Governments Seek Higher Returns; Cash-rich Nations’ Secretive 
Investment Funds May Hurt Treasuries, Trigger Backlash, USA TODAY, June 21, 2007, § Money, 
at 1B. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Gas Fever: Happiness Is a Full Tank, TIME MAG., Feb. 18, 1974. See also TRUMAN, 
A SCOREBOARD, supra note 3. 
 18. Weiss, supra note 12. 
 19. Id. See also TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD, supra note 3. 
 In December 
2007, Saudi Arabia announced plans to establish an SWF that is likely to be 
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the world’s largest.20 The proposed Saudi fund would dwarf the world’s 
presently largest SWF, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and 
Corporation (ADIA).21
Not only have SWFs increased in numbers, their value has grown 
rapidly in recent years. The value of Norway’s Government Pension Fund – 
Global grew 28% in 2006, resulting in current holdings exceeding $300 
billion.
 
22 The value of the portfolio for Singapore’s Temasek Holdings rose 
35% to $108 billion in assets. 23 The Kuwait Investment Authority grew 
30% to reach over $200 billion in holdings.24 The growth rate for Russia’s 
Stabilization Fund was 96%.25  The fund had over $140 billion in assets in 
2007.26 The ADIA has achieved a 20% rate of return for many years and 
rarely considers deals less than $100 million.27 Although China’s $3 billion 
investment in the Blackstone Group has lost more than half its value,28 
China’s $1.5 trillion in foreign reserves is growing at a rate of more than 
$20 billion a month.29
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimates that SWFs have a 
combined $2.5 trillion at their disposal, larger than the combined assets of 
all hedge funds and private equity funds.
 
30 Morgan Stanley projects that 
SWFs will grow to $12 trillion by 2015.31 Funds derived from oil and gas 
export revenues constitute approximately two-thirds of the total assets held 
by SWFs, with the rest consisting of funds primarily controlled by Asian 
surplus exporters.32
                                                                                                                 
 20. Henny Sender & David Wighton, Saudis Plan Huge Sovereign Wealth Fund, FIN. TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 2007, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto1221200 
71455059553. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Investments—World Grows More Wary of Sovereign Wealth Funds, ASIAMONEY, 
Nov. 28, 2007, available at http://www.asiamoney.com/Article/2055809/Channel/                
18816/INVESTMENTS-World-grows-more-wary-of-sovereign-wealth-funds.html [hereinafter 
Investments]. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD, supra note 3. 
 27. Henny Sender, Live at Apollo (Management): Plan to Cash In, Limit Scrutiny, WALL ST. 
J., July 17, 2007 at C1. 
 28. Michael Flaherty, Sovereign Wealth Funds are Shying Away from Wall Street Firms, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., Mar. 18, 2008, § Finance, at 12.  
 29. For further detail, see the monthly data on the website of China’s State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE), http://www.safe.gov.cn. 
 30. George F. Will, Investors We Need Not Fear, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 3, 2008, at B07, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/01/AR200802010 
2662.html. 
 31. Stephen Jen, Currencies: How Big Can Sovereign Wealth Funds be by 2015, MORGAN 
STANLEY GLOBAL RES., May 3, 2007. See also Investments, supra note 22 (Gerard Lyons, chief 
economist at Standard Chartered, estimates that SWFs will grow six-fold in the next decade, a 
potential total of $13.2 trillion). 
 32. Jen, supra note 31. 
 Table 1 provides a list of the major SWFs in the world. 
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Table 133
Country 
 
World’s Largest SWFs 
Funds Size ($ 
billions) 
Year  
Established 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 
and Corporation (ADIA)  
500–875 1976 
Mubadala Development Company 10 2002 
Isithmar 4 2003 
Norway Government Pension Fund – Global  329 1990 
Singapore Government of Singapore  
Investment Corporation (GIC) 
100–330 1981 
Temasek Holdings 108 1974 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 213 1960 
China China Investment Corporation, Ltd. 
(CIC) 
200 2007 
Russia Stabilization Fund for the Russian 
Federation  
141 2004 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 50 2005 
Australia Future Fund 49 2006 
Algeria Revenue Regulations Fund 43 2000 
United States Alaska Permanent Fund 40 1976 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 30 1983 
Korea Korea Investment Corporation 20 2005 
Kazakhstan National Oil Fund 19 2000 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional 18 1993 
Venezuela National Development Fund 15 2005 
Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 1 1998 
Canada Alberta Heritage Savings Trust 
Fund 
15 1976 
Chile Economic and Social Stabilization 
Fund 
10 2006 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund 10 2001 
Iran Oil Stabilization Fund 9 2000 
B. REASONS FOR SWF GROWTH AND CHANGES IN SWF 
INVESTMENT APPROACHES 
The recent growth of SWFs can be attributed to several factors. First, it 
is a consequence of the rapid increase of commodity prices and large trade 
surpluses in emerging markets. 34 The recent commodity price boom has 
swelled the asset holdings of commodity-exporting countries.35
                                                                                                                 
 33. TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD, supra note 3. See also Belinda Cao, China’s $200 Billion 
Sovereign Fund Begins Operations, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 29, 2007, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=aPeGXnGYN9g4 (last visited Apr. 9, 
2009). 
 34. Weiss, supra note 12. 
 35. Id. 
 The value 
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of oil and gas exports from the Middle East was about $650 billion in 2007 
and is expected to rise in coming years.36 Worldwide government revenues 
from oil and gas are estimated at $510 billion for 2007 and will keep 
increasing. 37  Considering these revenues to be temporary, Middle East 
countries have avoided using them for domestic expenditures, which may 
cause serious economic problems such as inflation. Instead, they have 
invested the excess commodity-export income in SWFs.38 The savings thus 
serve as a financial stabilizer if commodity prices decline and depress tax 
revenue. 39  Because they serve immediate needs, funds intended for 
financial stabilization tend to be conservative in their investment decisions, 
focusing on fixed income rather than equity investment.40
Although many oil funds are predominantly oriented towards 
stabilization, as the assets of funds reach a level beyond stabilization needs, 
the objective of saving wealth across generations takes priority.
 
41 
Consequently, savings funds are utilized to transform public assets, such as 
oil and other natural resources that are subject to fluctuating commodity 
prices, into a diversified and conceivably stable global portfolio, thereby 
protecting the income stream for future generations. As compared to 
stabilization funds, savings funds are characterized as having longer 
investment horizons and more aggressive investment strategies.42 Savings 
funds are invested in a broader range of assets, including longer-term 
government bonds, agency and asset-backed securities, corporate bonds, 
equities, commodities, real estate, derivatives, private equity, hedge funds, 
and foreign direct investment.43
A second factor behind the growth of SWFs is the long-standing trade 
surpluses of Asian emerging market countries with the United States and 
other Western countries, resulting in huge foreign currency reserves.
 
44 
Following the 1998 Asian financial crisis, many Asian economies began 
accumulating large amounts of reserves to provide adequate insurance 
against future currency fluctuations. 45
                                                                                                                 
 36. AASIM M. HUSAIN, RIDING THE CREST OF THE OIL BOOM, IMF MIDDLE EAST AND 
CENTRAL ASIA DEPARTMENT (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/ 
2007/CAR1030A.htm; see also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
OUTLOOK: MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA, Oct. 2008. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stumbling Blocks or Stepping Stones to Financial Globalization, 
FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER, Dec. 14, 2007, http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/ 
2007/el2007-38.html. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Rachel Ziemba, Responses to Sovereign Wealth Funds: Are ‘Draconian’ Measures on the 
Way?, RGE MONITOR, Nov. 2007, available at http://www.rgemonitor.com/economonitor-
monitor/220669/responses_to_sovereign_wealth_funds_are_draconian_measures_on_the_way. 
 41. See Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 38. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Weiss, supra note 12. 
 45. See Asset-backed Insecurity, supra note 8. 
 Given the goal of these currency 
2009] How Should Sovereign Wealth Funds Be Regulated? 489 
reserves, they were invested conservatively. For example, China initially 
invested much of its reserves in U.S. government treasury bills, which 
offered little risk but low rates of return on the investment.46 As the foreign 
reserves grew beyond Asian countries’ immediate needs, however, their 
risk tolerance increased, and the countries holding large reserves began 
diversifying portfolios and seeking riskier yet potentially higher-yielding 
investments. 47  Finally, in addition to trade surpluses, foreign currency 
reserves of countries like China also result from their attempts to limit the 
appreciation of their own currency against the dollar.48
C. SWF GOALS & TRANSPARENCY 
 
SWF owners claim to have different goals for their funds. The CIC was 
created to “improve the rate of return on China’s . . . foreign exchange 
reserves and to soak up some of the nation’s excess financial liquidity.”49 
The Norwegian government says its fund is an instrument for ensuring that 
a reasonable portion of the country’s petroleum wealth benefits future 
generations.50 A country may have multiple SWFs and multiple goals for 
the funds. The United Arab Emirates created the ADIA, its primary fund, to 
invest surplus cash in assets that provide steady returns over the long run; 
its newer fund, Mubadala Development, however, has pursued direct 
investment projects targeted at higher returns.51
SWFs also differ in management and levels of transparency. Norway’s 
and Qatar’s funds are directly managed through the central bank or the 
finance ministry, while the United Arab Emirate’s funds are incorporated as 
private companies with some degree of independence.
 
52
                                                                                                                 
 46. Joe McDonald, China to Create Firm to Invest Its $1 Trillion in Reserves, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Mar. 10, 2007, available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid= 
5039. 
 47. Lynch, supra note 15. 
 48. Wayne M. Morrison & Marc Labonte, China’s Currency: Economic Issues and Options 
for U.S. Trade Policy, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (RL32165; Jan. 9, 2008). 
 49. Michael F. Martin, China’s Sovereign Wealth Funds, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 
(RL34337; Jan. 22, 2008). 
 However, funds’ 
management structure does not necessarily speak of their transparency 
level. The funds of Norway, New Zealand, Alaska, and Canada are highly 
transparent in their investment criteria and financial accounting. They 
conventionally invest in a wide range of investments, including bonds, 
 50. See, e.g., Transparency and Trust: Keys to the Norwegian Pension Fund, Norway the 
Official Site in the United States, http://www.norway.org/policy/gpf/norwegian+pension+fund+ 
global.htm. 
 51. Weiss, supra note 12, at 7. 
 52. Jim Hamilton’s World of Securities Regulation, SEC and European Commission Seek 
More Transparency for Sovereign Wealth Funds, http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/search? 
q=SEC+and+European+Commission+Seek+More+Transparency+for+Sovereign+Wealth+Funds 
(Dec. 25, 2007, 16:15 EST). 
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equities, commodities, and foreign direct investment. 53  Malaysia’s SWF 
and Singapore’s Temasek Holdings, while also transparent, pursue more 
strategic holdings, targeting industries that are of sovereign interest.54 Funds 
controlled by the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and China are 
among those that disclose the least information about their activities and are 
most likely to consider sovereign interests in their investing activities.55
III. SWFS: CONCERNS AND BENEFITS 
 
Because SWFs have become increasingly active as market participants, 
they will likely affect financial markets in a systematic manner. SWFs thus 
draw attention from financial analysts and policymakers, who have assessed 
the benefits and possible detriments of SWFs. This part begins with a list of 
concerns about sovereign funds, followed by an evaluation of them. It 
concludes by analyzing the benefits that SWFs have brought and will likely 
bring to the U.S. and global economies. 
A. CONCERNS ABOUT SWF ACTIVITIES 
1. Lack of Transparency 
SWF transparency can be measured in terms of the level of disclosure 
of the following factors: size of the fund, types of investment, earnings, 
holders of investment mandates, auditing, geographic location, investment 
instruments, and currency composition of investments.56 Among the funds 
that have shown a high level of transparency are the funds of Norway and 
New Zealand. 57 In contrast, those owned by the United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar, Kuwait, and China are less transparent.58
SWF transparency is important for a few key reasons. First, limited 
disclosure of SWFs makes it difficult to determine whether funds are 
pursuing non-commercial interests, which has created fear of SWF 
activities.
 
59 Second, the lack of disclosure also makes it difficult to assess 
governance of the funds by obscuring mismanagement and governance 
irregularities within the funds.60
                                                                                                                 
 53. See Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 38. 
 54. Weiss, supra note 12. 
 55. TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD, supra note 3. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Weiss, supra note 12. 
 60. Id. 
 This problem is of particular concern as 
many SWFs are established in countries that lack the underpinnings for 
good corporate governance. Some policymakers consider that, in these 
countries, sizable failures in management and corruption by fund managers 
are possible, and that the problem may be worsened because of limited 
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disclosure under which the risk of the funds cannot be monitored as 
necessary.61
2. Strategic Holdings 
 
The rise of SWFs has triggered concern over “state capitalism.”62 By 
investing heavily in U.S. companies, foreign governments can use SWFs to 
seize control of companies in sensitive sectors to promote their own 
political agenda and threaten U.S. national security. 63  Strategic areas 
include financial services, defense, energy, and telecommunications.64
According to Dealogic, a financial data provider, SWFs invested $37.9 
billion in U.S. financial institutions in 2007, 63% of total SWF activity.
 
65 
Investment in financial services offers potential access to technology and 
expertise unavailable abroad that can be transferred home. 66  There are 
misgivings about sovereign stakes in U.S. banks given Asian countries’ 
interest in developing their domestic financial markets.67 Alex Pollock of 
the American Enterprise Institute stated in 2008 that SWFs were “arms of 
the state,” and that “out-flow of insider knowledge” due to foreign stakes in 
U.S. banks should be taken seriously.68
Defense is another area of investment raising national security 
concerns. In early 2006, Dubai Ports World, a company controlled by the 
government of Dubai, attempted to acquire Peninsular & Oriental Steam 
Navigation Co., a U.K.-based company running global operations in more 
than a dozen ports, including six U.S. port facilities.
 
69 The attempt caused 
debates over whether U.S. national security was threatened by the 
transaction, and Dubai Ports World, under U.S. pressure, agreed to spin off 
the American assets to a purely American company.70
Acquisitions of large holdings in energy are considered another 
potential threat to national security. In 2005, China National Offshore Oil 
Cooperation attempted to purchase the U.S. energy company Unocal, which 
triggered substantial congressional debates, including debates concerning 
 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Andrew Ross Sorkin, What Money Can Buy: Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/business/22sorkin.html?dlbk. 
 64. Richard Portes, Sovereign Wealth Funds, VOXEU, Oct. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/636. See also David Rothnie, Sovereign Wealth 
Spending on Banks Exceeds $50bn, FIN. NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 14, 2008, http://www.financialnews-
us.com/?page=ushome&contentid=2449561453. 
 65. Rothnie, supra note 64. 
 66. See Investments, supra note 22. 
 67. Cole, supra note 2. 
 68. Mullane & Kaul, supra note 6. 
 69. See Greg Hitt, Lawmakers Keep Up Pressure on Dubai Ports Firm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 
2006, at A4. 
 70. Mullane & Kaul, supra note 6. 
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China’s possible intention to secure access to natural resources, causing 
China to abandon the deal.71
Telecommunication is also an area raising national security issues. 
Foreign ownership in telecommunications is regarded as a threat to the 
dilution of culturally significant content in broadcasting.
 
72
3. Threat to Market Stability 
 
SWF activities have sparked concerns that large foreign holdings of 
U.S. securities increase the risk of a financial crisis as a result of potential 
large-scale liquidation or portfolio adjustments for economic or non-
economic reasons. 73 Some believe that if a withdrawal of foreign funds 
occurs during a period when the domestic economy is growing slowly, the 
impact of such withdrawal will be damaging. 74  The Federal Reserve 
typically reduces interest rates to stimulate the economy. However, if 
outflows of needed capital occurred in an economic recession, it would 
force the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to attract capital inflows.75 
Elevated rates would lead some companies to reduce borrowing and 
investing. They would also discourage household consumption, especially 
of interest-sensitive products such as housing and automobiles.76 Over the 
long run, persistently lower levels of investment and consumption would 
impact the growth rate of the economy.77
Another concern relating to market security is the uncertain risk of 
hybrid instruments that have been used in SWFs.
 
78 A hybrid instrument 
generally refers to a financial vehicle that blends characteristics of debt and 
equity markets. 79  An example of a hybrid instrument is a convertible 
bond.80 For the purpose of the Bank Holding Company Act (the Act),81 a 
hybrid instrument is classified as debt.82
                                                                                                                 
 71. Edmund L. Andrews, A Furor Was Built on Many Grudges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/03/business/03react.html. 
 Since investment in debt generally 
does not give a lender voting rights or control over a company, the 
controlling ownership threshold applied to a foreign investor’s equity 
 72. JEFFREY ROBERTSON, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR, 
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/pubs/RN/2004-05/05rn34.htm. 
 73. JAMES K. JACKSON, U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF 
U.S. FINANCIAL ASSETS: IMPLICATIONS OF A WITHDRAWAL (RL34319; Jan. 14, 2008).  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Cole, supra note 2. 
 79. What Does Hybrid Security Mean?, Investopedia, a Forbes Digital Company, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hybridsecurity.asp. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006). 
 82. Cole, supra note 2. 
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holding under the Act does not apply to its investment in debt. 83 
Accordingly, as long as SWF investments represent less than ten percent of 
the bank or bank holding company’s voting shares, they will escape 
scrutiny under the Act even though SWFs also hold hybrids.84 Some have 
expressed concern that sovereign funds may try to boost their stake in U.S. 
companies by investing in the form of hybrids.85
4. Conflicts of Interest 
 
Conflicts of interest are also a concern for SWFs. They commonly arise 
when a government is both the regulator and the regulated.86 Christopher 
Cox, former chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), has raised concern over conflicts of interest in SWFs.87 According to 
Cox, because foreign governments control SWFs, SWFs may not be fully 
cooperative in the SEC’s investigation of cases where a government-backed 
issuer is suspected of violating U.S. securities laws, which may jeopardize 
investors’ interests and the SEC’s mission of protecting investor and market 
integrity.88
B. CONCERNS ABOUT SWFS ARE UNTENABLE 
 
Foreign investments have existed in the U.S. market for a long time,89 
but there is no empirical data showing that they are or have been used to 
engage in market manipulation or to serve as a political vehicle to force the 
United States to compromise its national security.90 Although the historical 
record may not determine the future course of SWF activities, it potentially 
demonstrates the true nature of the funds. Also, other than for commercial 
reasons, it is difficult to imagine what types of events could trigger a 
withdrawal of SWFs from U.S. financial markets.91
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continue growing at the current rates, SWFs will remain a small portion of 
the world economy, and can hardly disrupt it in a significant manner.92 In 
today’s globally interdependent market, collective manipulation of large 
funds, such as a sudden withdrawal of the funds from the U.S. market, is 
more likely to harm foreign investors than to harm the U.S. economy as a 
whole.93 Other mechanisms help prevent SWF mischief, including market 
competition, 94  the passivity of SWFs, 95
1. SWFs Constitute a Small Portion of the World Economy 
 and SWF owners’ increased 
awareness of financial practices. Therefore, many concerns and 
speculations about SWF harm are unfounded. 
Although they grow rapidly, with an estimated $2.5 trillion in total 
assets, SWFs are worth “much less than the $16 trillion, $18 trillion and 
$22 trillion managed by insurance companies, pension funds and mutual 
funds, respectively.”96 In fact, total SWF assets make up only 2% of the 
world’s $165 trillion in traded securities.97 Even if SWFs maintain their 
growth rate and reach $12 trillion by 2015, the funds will still account for 
less than 3% of global traded securities.98
The following statistics also illuminate the size of SWF assets.  First, 
combined SWF assets are a small fraction of the $14 trillion U.S. 
economy.
 
99 Second, the U.S. economy is larger than the next four largest 
economies combined—those of Japan, Germany, Britain and China. 100 
Finally, Russia’s economy is about the size of New York’s and Arizona’s 
combined, and India’s economy is about half the size of California’s.101
2. Collective Maneuvering of Funds Will Harm Foreign 
Investors Themselves 
 
If foreign investors with large holdings attempt to collectively 
maneuver their funds to threaten U.S. markets, they will likely either 
liquidate U.S. Treasury securities rapidly, or shift the composition of their 
portfolios.102
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 These activities, however, will be more likely to cause damage 
to the investors themselves than to the U.S. economy because of the 
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interdependent nature of the global market and the market’s capability for 
self-adjustment.103
If foreign investors attempt to liquidate their U.S. securities rapidly, 
they will likely experience a severe loss for two reasons. First, their attempt 
to sell quickly will create a huge supply of securities in the market, which 
will reduce their gains from liquidation.
 
104  Second, their attempt to 
transform their dollar holdings into other currencies will create large 
demand for other currencies, which will drive up their investment 
outlays.105
Further, the impact of such liquidation on the U.S. economy will likely 
be minimal because other investors will arbitrage these transactions for their 
benefit.
 Given these losses, foreign investors seem unlikely to engage in 
coordinated large-scale liquidation. 
106 In the face of a large-scale liquidation of dollar-denominated 
assets, new investors may well consider these assets undervalued and, 
accordingly, liquidate or leverage their now higher-priced foreign securities 
and use the proceeds to acquire dollar-denominated assets, thereby 
replacing those selling U.S. securities. 107  Given the dynamic nature of 
capital markets and the instant communication of information, the adverse 
effects on the U.S. economy due to such a large-scale liquidation, including 
the reduced price of Treasury securities and increased interest rates, should 
be “short-lived.”108
Another strategy that foreign investors could take, with an aim to 
adversely affect the U.S. markets, is a shift in the make-up of their 
portfolios.
 
109 Yet, the adjustment of portfolio composition is by no means a 
new phenomenon—investors have always engaged in it while reassessing 
their investment risks and regulators’ policies.110 If foreign investors seek to 
diversify the composition of their portfolios among dollar-denominated 
assets, the exchange value of the dollar will not be affected because the total 
demand for dollar-denominated assets will remain constant. 111 If foreign 
investors shift their large holdings away from U.S. securities to other 
currency-denominated assets, the shift of supply and demand in the 
securities market will settle at prices that will be close to those that existed 
prior to the original shift by foreign investors.112
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will take advantage of the shift made by foreign investors, using higher-
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affiliates, thereby boosting the balance sheet of their U.S. headquarters and 
strengthening investments within the United States.113
In the “context of mutual dependence, [b]lowing somebody else up 
does you at least as much financial damage.”
 
114
3. Investing with Non-commercial Incentives is Self-defeating 
 Because an interdependent 
relationship exists among the global market participants and the market has 
strong capability for self-adjustment, a large-scale maneuver of funds by 
foreign investors will likely not produce as much damage to the U.S. 
economy as it will to foreign investors themselves. Consequently, foreign 
investors are likely to refrain from such self-damaging business activities. 
Among the concerns about SWFs is the possibility that they will be 
invested with non-commercial motives. However, “[r]unning a business 
non-commercially is a recipe for huge losses rather than world 
domination,”115 and will be avoided by any rational investor. Free markets 
and competition have the capability to correct distorted motives. 116  An 
example helps illustrate this point: if a country experienced bad publicity 
for its defective products and had its SWF buy an American toy company to 
let the company sell toys made in the SWF country, the company would 
lose customers quickly to its competitors. 117  Therefore, even if foreign 
investors invested with governmental instead of commercial interests, the 
market would likely respond accordingly by driving the investor out of the 
market. “Free markets don’t require that everyone try to maximize profits; 
they just need competition, so that if a company makes bad decisions 
someone else can come in and take advantage.”118
4. Dangers of Hybrid Securities are Overstated 
 Accordingly, investing 
with non-commercial intentions is not a rational choice for investors, 
including SWF owners. As long as competition is present in the market, a 
company that acts out of non-commercial motives will act at its own peril. 
SWF owners should be aware of this and refrain from investing non-
commercially. 
U.S. banks have raised much capital from SWFs in the form of hybrid 
securities.119
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controlling ownership threshold under the Bank Holding Company Act.120 
However, the danger is overstated because hybrid securities do not have the 
voting rights that straight equity has. 121  Further, sovereign funds have 
chosen not to take board seats, thereby keeping their investments passive.122
Arguably, foreign investors could gain some influence over a bank if it 
were to become insolvent, because hybrid securities, although subordinated 
debt, would nevertheless give investors some claim on a bank’s assets. 
However, no one, including issuers and investors, would want the bank to 
go bankrupt. The claim at liquidation only gives investors limited influence, 
if any.
 
123
5. Concern over the Outflow of Financial Knowledge is 
Unnecessary 
 
Another concern over SWF activities arises from the ambition of SWF 
holders to develop their own financial markets. For example, China and 
Singapore have expressed their interest in using investments in overseas 
financial institutions to acquire money-management knowledge to help 
develop their domestic capital markets. 124  Such an agenda is “benign,” 
however.125 It is inevitable that an investor with large holdings will gain 
financial knowledge. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that a market 
participant with money at stake will be indifferent toward financial 
knowledge. U.S. financial and legal systems have actually encouraged 
investors’ research to gain market information and sophistication.126 The 
federal securities laws are derived from one simple and straightforward 
concept: disclosure.127 All investors, whether large institutions or private 
individuals, should have access to information about an investment prior to 
buying it and while holding it.128
Further, it does not seem possible to preclude foreign investors from 
seeking various paths to financial knowledge. In addition to learning from 
investing, knowledge can be obtained by other ways, such as the flow of 
human capital. The CIC, for example, has attempted to recruit financial 
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talent from around the globe since it was founded in 2007.129 The CIC is 
now in negotiations with many experts, including Alan Greenspan, in the 
hope that these experts will help the CIC determine global investment 
strategies and policies.130
C. SWFS BENEFIT U.S. AND GLOBAL ECONOMIES 
 Finally, an effort to learn good financial practices 
should be a good sign that foreign investors are focused on the bottom 
line—maximizing returns on their investments. 
Given the instant flow of information enabled by advanced technology 
and the free movement of human capital, learning from investments in 
overseas financial institutions is unavoidable in a global market. Moreover, 
gaining financial knowledge should help foreign investors appreciate the 
importance of complying with financial rules, which will give them a 
foundation to become responsible and credible market participants. 
Obtaining financial knowledge will also help foreign investors find 
common terms in which they can effectively communicate with other 
market participants. This is extremely important because addressing SWF 
concerns requires not only an effort from countries receiving SWF 
investments, but also input from the foreign investors holding SWFs. 
Consequently, concern over the outflow of financial knowledge is 
unnecessary. 
Although recent SWF activities have raised a variety of concerns, 
including their possible function as an instrument to achieve sovereign 
rather than commercial goals and possible large-scale withdrawal of funds 
from U.S. market, the concerns are clearly overstated. In fact, a review of 
the history of foreign investment shows that SWFs should bring benefits to 
U.S. and global economies. 
1. Foreign Investments Benefit the General Economy 
Foreign investment is a vital force for creating employment and 
innovation. 131  Foreign-owned companies employ approximately one in 
twenty American workers. 132  These jobs on average pay thirty percent 
higher than the national median for their respective industries.133 Foreign 
investment also benefits the U.S. economy by increasing real estate value, 
preserving agricultural land, and promoting venture capital. 134
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exportation of goods worth over $150 billion in 2003, helping combat the 
U.S. trade deficit. 135 It is also an important factor to which economists 
attribute vigorous U.S. economic growth.136 In Canada, parliamentary data 
has shown that foreign investment restrictions effectively impede 
innovation and expansion of the Canadian economy. 137 As a result, the 
Canadian government has commenced proceedings to lift restrictions on 
foreign investment.138
In the United States, capital inflows lower interest rates and increase 
access to capital for American enterprise.
 
139  Without such capital, U.S. 
consumers would have to pay higher rates for home mortgages and car 
loans than when the capital is available.140 These foreign capital inflows 
thus allow consumer expenditures to exceed the country’s current level of 
output of goods and services.141 Absent such capital, businesses would have 
to finance purchases at high rates, which would increase business costs, 
pushing up prices and affecting consumers’ standard of living.142 Presently, 
foreign investment is critical because the United States faces both a 
historically “high national budget deficit and historically low levels of 
public savings.”143
2. SWFs Play a Bridging-gap Role in U.S. Capital Markets 
 Consequently, foreign capital benefits the economy and 
is needed in this country. 
In an open market, capital flows to where it can be used most 
efficiently.144 This argument is corroborated by an economic analysis of 
Federal Reserve data during the years from 1996 and 2006. The analysis 
shows the interplay among household (individual) savings, the extent of 
deficit or surplus of governments, and foreign capital flows.145 When there 
was a lack of household savings and a government surplus, investment was 
filled with large capital inflows.146 In contrast, when there were sufficient 
domestic sources of funds, foreign capital fell and flowed out of the 
country.147
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2000 to 2006, as the United States experienced historically large household 
dissaving and historically large governmental deficits in nominal terms.148 
Accordingly, SWFs flowed to the U.S. market as a response to the credit 
crunch, and the gap-bridging role it plays will support the country’s 
continuing economic development.149
3. SWFs Should Be a Stabilizing Force in Riskier Markets 
 
Empirical data show that SWFs tend to be stabilizers, rather than 
disrupters.150 Because SWFs are used to save for future generations or to 
stabilize domestic economies, they typically have a long-term horizon, 
avoiding rapid liquidations during market volatility. 151  Moreover, SWFs 
tend not to be highly leveraged, which makes them a strong force for 
stability.152 As SWF assets are increasingly allocated to riskier securities,153 
they should be a stabilizing force for riskier financial markets. 154
[SWFs] contribute to the broadening of the long-term investor base for 
risky assets, such as equities, corporate bonds, emerging market assets, 
private equity and real estate. In this regard, such funds could become a 
more stable investor base for risky assets in certain markets. In addition, 
provided that the investments of such funds are driven entirely by risk and 
return considerations, SWFs may contribute to a more efficient allocation 
and diversification of risk at the global level.
 In its 
December 2007 Financial Stability Review, the European Central Bank 
wrote: 
155
The stabilizing role of foreign capital can be seen by a comparative 
analysis of the U.S. economy during two time periods: November 1982 
through December 2007, and 1945 through 1982.
 
156 In the former period, 
large overseas capital was available and the economy was in recession only 
4.6 percent of the time.157
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 In contrast, during the latter time frame, foreign 
capital was generally unavailable, and recession accounted for 22.4 percent 
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of the time.158 Consequently, the inflow of foreign funds has played a role 
in stabilizing the economy. Because SWFs help stabilize the investor base 
for riskier markets across national borders, they are likely to contribute to a 
more rational allocation of risk at the global level.159 As a result, the debate 
continues as to whether SWFs can be used as part of the efforts to tackle the 
current financial crisis.160
IV. U.S. RESPONSES TO SWF INVESTMENTS AND 
REGULATIONS 
 
Opinions about SWFs within the United States are split. While there 
has been fear that SWFs are going to buy up America and threaten U.S. 
national security, 161  many economists take the view that “money is 
naturally going to gravitate toward dollar-based assets because of the 
strength of our economy.”162 The strengths of the U.S economy include a 
well-developed financial system, large market size, strong per-capita buying 
power, advanced transportation and communication facilities,163 as well as a 
favorable regulatory scheme, overall economic stability, and political 
stability with regard to trade policy.164 These factors have contributed to the 
rise in foreign investment.165
A. U.S. POLICY AND REGULATIONS WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 
 
U.S. government leaders have traditionally advocated an open foreign-
investment policy.166 President Reagan is particularly credited for shaping 
modern U.S. policy in this area. After the end of the Cold War, with the 
resulting global environment amenable to international trade, President 
Reagan encouraged foreign investment in the United States by highlighting 
the benefits the country provides to foreign investors.167
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 This policy led to 
an unprecedented level of foreign capital imported into the United States 
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and vigorous domestic economic growth.168 The United States won “the 
global race for capital.”169 As a result of its liberal policy toward foreign 
investment, the United States led a modern revolution toward globalization 
and the free movement of capital, promoting its status as the leader in 
advancing democratic and capitalist ideologies. 170  The United States 
continues to encourage other nations to reduce investment barriers through 
participation in multilateral negotiations such as the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).171
Because of its policies favoring open investment, U.S. regulation of 
foreign investment was relaxed except in extreme cases.
 
172 The Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)173
The United States has traditionally welcomed Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and provided foreign investors fair, equitable and nondiscriminatory 
treatment with few limited exceptions designed to protect national 
security. [U.S. regulations with regard to foreign investment are] . . . 
implemented within the context of this open investment policy.
 characterizes U.S. 
policy toward foreign investment as follows: 
174
In 1977, the first statute to regulate foreign investment, the International 
Economic Emergency Powers Act, was passed.
 
175  The statute authorized 
the president to block transactions involving property of hostile 
governments or their citizens. 176  However, presidents were reluctant to 
invoke it because doing so would be close to “a declaration of hostilities 
against the government of the acquirer company.”177
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In 1988, the Exon-Florio provision of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act was passed as a response to the attempted acquisition 
of Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, an American company, by the 
Fujitsu Corporation, a Japanese company. 178  U.S. government officials 
viewed the deal as threatening national security because they believed that 
Japanese companies intended to dominate the world semiconductor 
market. 179  The Exon-Florio provision allowed the president to block 
transactions or divest foreign interests in U.S. companies that constituted 
threats to national security.180
In 1993, Congress expanded the Exon-Florio provision through the 
National Defense Authorization Act, known as the Byrd Amendment.
 
181 
Under the Byrd Amendment, the factors to be considered by CFIUS in 
determining whether a proposed transaction by a foreign entity is legitimate 
emphasize the national security implications of the foreign acquisitions.182 
The Byrd Amendment makes investigation of transactions by executive 
branches and offices mandatory when two conditions are met: when (1) the 
acquirer is “controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government,” and 
(2) the acquisition “could result in control of a person engaged in interstate 
commerce in the United States that could affect the national security of the 
United States.”183
The CFIUS regulations have triggered critiques because the definitions 
of key terms in the regulations are ambiguous.
 
184 First, the definition of 
“control” is not a bright line rule like the majority ownership standard;185
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instead, CFIUS looks to the functional abilities of an acquirer to exercise 
control. 186 The regulations provide that there is no control when voting 
securities are held “solely for the purpose of passive investment,” which 
means that the acquirer “does not plan or intend to exercise control . . . .”187 
The definition seems to be circular. The Exon-Florio provision has also 
been criticized because “national security” is not defined under the statute; 
rather, executive departments and offices have broad authority to determine 
on a case-by-case basis whether a transaction poses a threat to national 
security. 188  Because the national security standard is “a broad, vague 
generality” subject to “numerous inconsistent interpretations,”189 fear has 
arisen that foreign investors will seek other markets with less ambiguous 
regulatory standards.190
However, presidential action under the provision has been minimal. In 
the period between 1988 and 1999, the president investigated only 
seventeen of more than 1,200 companies that volunteered for review.
 
191 Of 
those investigated, seven withdrew their offers, and the president declined 
to pursue nine of the remaining ten cases.192 Until recently, CFIUS, with 
executive-authorized power to investigate foreign investment, applied a 
fairly narrow interpretation of the Exon-Florio provision.193 In applying the 
statute, CFIUS seems to have focused on balancing multilayered policy 
considerations, “seek[ing] to serve U.S. investment policy through thorough 
reviews that protect national security while maintaining the credibility of 
our open investment policy and preserving the confidence of foreign 
investors here and of U.S. investors abroad that they will not be subject to 
retaliatory discrimination.”194
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 193. Id. at 211. 
 194. U.S. Department of Treasury, supra note 172. 
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In addition to Exon-Florio, which targets foreign investments that 
implicate national security, other laws are in place that restrict the 
percentage of foreign ownership in sensitive sectors, which include 
aviation, defense, banking, electric and gas, mineral leases and resources, 
power generation and utility services, real estate, and communications and 
broadcasting. 195  Under the Bank Holding Act, for example, foreign 
investors must own less than twenty-five percent of a U.S. bank to avoid 
increased scrutiny.196 Aside from setting limits for the percentage of foreign 
ownership, statutes also look to the nationality of the owners or the 
management, in order to determine whether a U.S. subsidiary is used by 
foreign investors for their investment.197
B. NEW DEVELOPMENT: FINSA 
 
FINSA, a recent amendment to Exon-Florio, greatly affects SWF 
investment in the United States. 198 Its enactment was a consequence of 
substantial controversy surrounding the attempted acquisition of six major 
U.S. shipping ports by Dubai Ports World in 2006. 199  The planned 
transaction generated intense political debates and heightened interest in 
national security issues arising from foreign acquisitions of U.S.-based 
entities.200 In July 2007, Congress passed FINSA, aimed at reforming the 
Exon-Florio review process for foreign investment in U.S. entities.201
FINSA makes clear that foreign investments subject to national security 
review go well beyond those in the traditional defense sectors to include 
investments in “critical infrastructure.”
 While 
retaining the basic components of the CFIUS review procedures, FINSA 
mandates more rigorous procedures, including expanding the definition of 
industries that fall under the category to be reviewed by CFIUS, increasing 
post-closing scrutiny for previously reviewed and cleared transactions, and 
enhancing the executive and Congressional involvement in the scrutiny of 
overseas investments, especially that made by a foreign government. As a 
result, foreign entities investing in the United States are challenged by 
tougher regulatory treatment. 
202  Under FINSA, critical 
infrastructure is defined expansively as any “systems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or 
destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating impact on 
national security.”203
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 199. See The Don’t Invest in America Act, supra note 131. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Mullane & Kaul, supra note 6. 
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 203. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a)(6). 
 The definition of critical infrastructure permits more 
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industries to be included for CFIUS review, such as energy assets. Although 
the statute does not define energy assets, its legislative history implies that 
Congress expects CFIUS to interpret this term broadly to include electrical 
generating, transmission and distribution facilities, gas storage, 
transmission, and distribution facilities.204 The scope of national security is 
also expanded to include matters of homeland security.205
FINSA provides explicit statutory authority for CFIUS to “negotiate, 
enter into or impose, and enforce any agreement or condition with any party 
to the covered transaction in order to mitigate any threat to the national 
security of the United States that arises as a result of the covered 
transaction.”
 
206  Accordingly, CFIUS is statutorily empowered with the 
authority to require changes to a deal via a “mitigation agreement” in 
exchange for CFIUS approval. Further, CFIUS has the power to designate a 
lead agency to negotiate mitigation agreements.207 FINSA requires the lead 
agency to report periodically to CFIUS on the parties’ compliance with the 
agreed conditions and to report any material change in connection with a 
transaction.208
FINSA also requires greater scrutiny by CFIUS far beyond the business 
transaction itself. Under FINSA, where a foreign government-owned entity 
is involved, CFIUS must consider whether the foreign government is in 
compliance with U.S. and multilateral counter-terrorism, non-proliferation 
and export control regimes.
 
209
Congressional involvement in overseas investment is also enhanced by 
a mechanism established under FINSA where member agencies must meet 
in a commission and ask questions probing the risks associated with a 
transaction, both in terms of the threat to national security posed by the 
foreign investor, and the vulnerabilities of the asset or entity that is being 
acquired.
 As a result, factors that are not necessarily 
related to the transaction in question come under CFIUS scrutiny, which 
increases the uncertainty of doing business. 
210  These member agencies include: Homeland Security, 
Commerce, Defense, State, the Attorney General, Energy (a new addition), 
and the Treasury, whose secretary sits as the chair. 211
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 The secretary of 
Labor and the Director of National Intelligence act as non-voting 
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members. 212  FINSA also grants the president the discretion to appoint 
additional representatives from other executive agencies and offices. 213 
Further, following the conclusion of a CFIUS review, CFIUS must provide 
Congress with notice of the transaction, the actions taken, briefings, and 
certifications by CFIUS officials. 214
Finally, FINSA removes the safe harbor rule, which protected a 
previously reviewed and cleared transaction from post-closing scrutiny by 
CFIUS.
 As a result, FINSA significantly 
strengthens Congressional oversight of the review process. Such 
transaction-by-transaction Congressional involvement also raises the risk of 
political mischief. 
215 Post-closing scrutiny, which can result in asset divestitures or 
potential unwinding, can be invoked upon a finding of intentional omission 
or misrepresentation in the original notification to CFIUS, or the party’s 
material breach of a mitigation agreement.216
V. INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE IS POSSIBLE 
 
FINSA represents a unilateral U.S. action to deal with concerns over 
SWFs. Because of FINSA, foreign investors can expect an increased risk of 
delays, as well as political and bureaucratic inference in the proposed 
business transaction. Foreign investors will weigh the increased regulatory 
costs in making investment decisions, and will likely shy away from the 
U.S. market because of the regulatory uncertainty and political fights that 
ensue for larger SWF investments. This will likely affect the 
competitiveness of the United States in attracting capital. Therefore, strict 
enforcement of the statute is worthwhile only when the risks of SWFs 
outweigh their benefits and when there are no alternative ways to mitigate 
SWF risks. 
In tackling the perceived risks posed by SWFs, the establishment of 
international standards for SWF activities provides an attractive alternative 
to U.S. unilateral action. The elements that have been suggested for 
international standards include transparency, governance, and reciprocity.217 
A set of international codes that stress these elements offers a promising 
way to increase the accountability of SWF activities.218
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Because Norway’s fund is universally considered to be transparent and 
publicly accountable, it may become a model for other SWFs.219 Norway’s 
fund features detailed and regular disclosure about SWF activities, 
accounting and auditing information. 220  The fund is also considered an 
accountable investor with non-strategic holdings and “clear lines of 
responsibility between political authorities and the operational 
management.”221 In addition, the fund restricts its ownership to five percent 
of shares in any company in which it invests.222
In October 2007, the final G7 statement, while supporting the argument 
that the world economies “can benefit from openness to SWF investment 
flows,” urged that best practices be identified for SWFs in the areas of 
institutional structure, risk management, transparency and accountability.
 
223 
The G7 meeting further asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) to examine this area. 224  To prevent financial 
protectionism, the IMF also emphasized principles of nondiscrimination, 
transparency, and predictability among recipients of SWFs.225 OECD has 
produced guidelines building upon these principles.226
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, on behalf of the U.S., stated 
in the International Monetary and Finance Committee of the IMF that the 
United States values a multilateral approach that maintains open investment 
policies while seeking “[b]est practices [that] would provide multilateral 
guidance to new funds on how to make sound decisions, how to structure 
themselves, mitigate any potential systemic risk, and help demonstrate to 
critics that SWFs can be constructive, responsible participants in the 
international financial system.”
 
227
So far, SWF owners have responded favorably to the IMF’s request for 
more disclosure. They are aware of the tensions their activities have raised, 
and are “unlikely to exacerbate matters with aggressive acquisitions.”
 
228
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 For 
example, China and Singapore have expressed their willingness to comply 
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with best practices and increase transparency efforts.229 In November 2007, 
the CIC disclosed that a third of its $200 billion in assets would be used to 
buy foreign assets and that the other two-thirds would be invested 
domestically.230 The CIC further disclosed that it would invest mostly in 
portfolios rather than individual companies and that it had no intention of 
gaining controlling interests in any companies.231 China maintains that the 
CIC will prove to be a responsible corporate citizen, not investing in 
industries that damage the environment, waste energy or produce 
tobacco.232 Nor will it buy into overseas airlines, telecommunications or oil 
firms.233 In terms of management, China says that the CIC will have its own 
corporate governance structure, without governmental interference.234 Lou 
Jiwei, Chairman of the CIC, has argued that if any country receiving 
investments has misgivings, China “may choose to leave” or look 
elsewhere.235
We believe there is a case for further disclosure on the part of sovereign 
wealth funds in the interest of transparency. Such disclosure can include 
clarity on the relationship between the funds and the respective 
governments, their investment objectives and general strategies, and their 
internal governance and risk management practices . . . . Any guidelines 
on sovereign wealth funds should encourage them to operate according to 
commercial principles with a long-term orientation, free from political 
motivations. Singapore will participate in formulating a set of principles 
and best practices for sovereign wealth funds.
 Yet not all SWFs share the same position.  According to Tony 
Tan, Executive Director of Singapore’s GIC: 
236
Transparency of SWF investment has emerged as an issue of paramount 
importance. Transparency requires substantial quantitative disclosure about 
investment strategies, outcomes, and the nature and location of actual 
investments.
 
237 Transparency further dictates the activities of investment 
mechanisms to published, independent audits. 238
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 Also, those concerned 
about unjustified barriers for SWF flow argue that a lack of transparency is 
a factor leading to protectionism and a tougher environment for SWF 
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investment. 239
The mutual trust and confidence that transparency would establish 
should address many of the concerns SWF activities raise. First, an 
increased level of transparency will alleviate the negative impact of greater 
SWF investment by allowing financial markets to better monitor SWF 
activity and exercise market discipline.
 Therefore, a path that can counter suspicion and 
protectionism while meeting the requirements of transparency should be 
sought for SWFs. The international guidelines set by the IMF and OECD 
will likely contribute to this goal. 
240 Second, it serves the interests of 
SWF holders in that transparency will help reduce the mysteries and 
misunderstandings surrounding SWFs, thereby reducing hostility towards 
the funds and resulting in more stable and predictable environment for SWF 
activities.241
Although some observers are concerned that the IMF guidelines are 
voluntary and that there is no guarantee of compliance by nations holding 
SWFs, compliance should be expected because it serves the interests of 
nations receiving SWFs as well as those holding the funds. Moreover, most 
nations with SWFs are members of the IMF and are formally committed to 
a stable international monetary system.
 
242
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 Because mutual benefits will 
result from observing international best practices, such standards should be 
established and will likely be heeded. Compared to the unilateral, sweeping 
regulation of SWFs by the U.S., international standards emphasize 
cooperation and build confidence in the international community. 
SWFs have existed for more than half a century. They do not have a 
record of political or market mischief. Instead, their history shows that SWF 
investment spreads financial capital, helps the world economy adjust to 
imbalances, and gives countries stakes in each other’s prosperity. 
Regardless, the increasing size and activism in markets of SWFs, together 
with their state-controlled nature, have raised suspicions about these funds’ 
motives. If SWFs remain opaque, it is likely that a number of countries will 
increasingly oppose sovereign wealth acquisitions. That opposition will 
serve to restrict the investing activities and raise the investment risks for 
these funds. In response to the challenges posed by SWFs, the best option 
now available is to establish an internationally agreed upon standard to 
guide transparency and depress politically-driven investment decisions. The 
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guidelines are not only necessary, but also viable, as both recipients and 
owners of SWFs see that their interests lie in building confidence. 
Open investment policies bring about global prosperity. An open policy 
should be espoused without compromising national security and 
transparency. It need not lead to protectionist responses, however. Conflicts 
over one investment, such as Dubai Port World’s acquisition of U.S. port 
facilities, should not be generalized to all SWFs. Such generalizations spark 
uncertainty, spilling over into the trade of goods and services and causing 
undue damage to the economy.243
Zhao Feng
 This is especially dangerous during the 
current financial crisis. Instead of responding unilaterally with excessive 
regulations, the United States should play a leading role in the international 
community to establish a set of guidelines for SWF transparency. 
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